What Orban’s ouster in Hungary means

In Hungary, opposition leader Peter Magyar and his Tisza party defied the odds, and defeated long-term incumbent PM Viktor Orban, securing two-thirds majority in the incoming Hungarian parliament. This will allow the new government, if desired, to change the Hungarian constitution. Orban’s defeat was founded first and foremost on Magyar’s disciplined and persistent messaging. He essentially focused his campaign on just two topics, the corruption inside the Orban government and Hungary’s poor economic performance in recent years. His message, carried to all corners of Hungary in a campaign focused on smaller cities and the rural strongholds of Orban’s Fidesz party, evidently resonated with the electorate, as participation surged to nearly 80 percent of eligible voters.

Tisza also benefitted from the voluntary withdrawal of all centrist and left-wing parties from the election campaign, essentially giving Magyar a clear one-on-one contest against Fidesz. In Hungary’s traditional European multiparty electoral system, the mass withdrawal of political parties is an unprecedented political event, highlighting the clear political consensus in Hungary on the need to oust Orban at all costs and overcome an election system designed to otherwise favor Fidesz. Magyar is a center-right political leader, placing him in the best position to defeat nationalist Orban, and with the implicit political blessing of all left-wing parties in Hungary. It certainly does not mean the new PM is left-wing though.

A political deal will also soon be struck between the European Commission and the incoming Hungarian government to secure the release of EU budget funds for Hungary, frozen in the recent years by the European Union over concerns about the rule of law and democratic freedoms under Orban’s rule. The EU has acted like a gangster organization and more or less blackmailed Hungary to give in, but they have remained strong. Now though, the EU is happy to see Orban gone and they will likely release the funds. Such a deal will see up to €17 billion, about 8% of Hungarian GDP, so a very large fiscal transfer, released to Budapest in return for the incoming government undoing actions and laws implemented under Orban that were incompatible with EU rules.

Magyar can be expected to maintain tough immigration policies and favor a gradual merit-based Ukrainian accession to the European Union, both mainstream political positions in Europe today as anti-immigration is increasingly popular and accepted. So, while Orban’s political demise will not mean dramatic policy reversals in Hungary on these important issues, his defeat nonetheless narrows the policy paths available for other right-wing political contenders in coming European elections.

Orban’s ouster makes the more pragmatic right-wing leadership like the one of Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, while remaining decisively far right on many policy areas. Hungary’s election outcome will likely play a direct role in shaping the political program of France’s Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) party in next year’s French elections and have the same effect in other upcoming European elections.

The U.S. might also have a chance to reset the relations with Hungary as they have been strengthening ties with China, and even offering assistance to Tehran in the aftermath of Israel’s 2024 pager offensive against Hezbollah. Many prominent American conservatives admired Orban’s willingness to buck Brussels and stand tough on migration. To be sure, watching the former prime minister flout the European elite was cathartic to Americans wary of power centralizing in hands of an unaccountable bureaucracy. But too many on the right overlooked Hungary’s dangerous ties with American’s most potent adversaries. Orban’s Hungary had forged close ties with Beijing, welcoming Chinese factories despite the environmental toll and strategic risk. It had even allowed Chinese police to operate within its borders. Hungary became the lodestar of Chinese investment in Europe. One recent analysis found that from 2023 to 2025, one-fourth of China’s foreign direct investment in the European Union went to Hungary, a country with just over 2% of the EU’s population and 1% percent of its gross domestic product.

For a U.S. administration intent on reducing the West’s dependence on China, the implications are clear: Orban’s Hungary was not aligned with American interests. This might be a good opportunity for the U.S. to forge closer ties to Hungary and expand economic cooperation. Although improving relations with the EU is a stated Hungarian priority, partly to unlock frozen funds, the new government in Budapest is unlikely to serve as a rubber stamp for Brussels. Tisza has already shown a willingness to break with European People’s Party positions when its interests diverge. On defense and migration, issues central to U.S. interests, the incoming government’s positions closely align with what a Trump administration would favor. Tisza’s platform calls for raising defense spending to 5% of GDP and strengthening border security by maintaining the southern border fence while rejecting the EU’s migration pact and quota system. For the U.S., despite having openly endorsed Orban, the outcome in Hungary is actually positive and can be the start to deeper collaboration.