What happened to democracy in Venezuela?
The capture of Maduro on January 3, 2026 set off a series of changes best summed up by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who told members of Congress in June that since the operation, Venezuela no longer poses the same threat to the United States. The U.S. diplomatic presence has been reestablished, enabling cooperation on security and intelligence. Territorial control has been partially regained from drug traffickers, guerrillas and the Tren de Aragua criminal network. Cuban, Russian and Iranian influence has been reduced. Macroeconomic indicators have improved on the back of rising oil production, and the first steps toward a democratic transition have been taken. But why is this transition taking so long? The regime continues to maintain control over institutions, and macroeconomic improvements have not yet translated into lower inflation, higher wages or the restoration of public services.
The devastating earthquakes that struck northern Venezuela in late June have become the first major test of the interim regime’s ability to govern. The initial response exposed the same institutional weaknesses that have slowed the transition: poor emergency preparedness and politicized decision-making. It seems that Venezuela remains far from democracy, noting that the country still lacks the conditions for free elections and continues to hold hundreds of political prisoners.
Still, it could be argued that the first part Trump’s three-phase plan for Venezuela, stabilization, recovery and transition, has been successfully implemented. There were no outbreaks of violence and no displacement crisis. Washington secured access to oil and strategic minerals and took control of security without a military invasion. U.S. action in Venezuela began before Maduro’s capture, with Operation Southern Spear, focused on drug trafficking. Between September 2025 and June 2026, U.S. forces struck at least 59 vessels alleged to be carrying drugs. On December 18, 2025, an American missile hit an ammunition depot in Zulia state linked to trafficking. The campaign appears to have persuaded many local traffickers not to ship to the U.S. There has been a radical change, because the Venezuelan military is now cooperating with the U.S. military to combat terrorism and drug cartels.
The second phase of Trump’s plan focuses on economic recovery. In early June, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas said on X that Venezuelan oil exports had reached 1.25 million barrels per day, the highest level in seven years. This increase has been possible, in part, because of sanctions relief. It also owes something to the reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons, which allows private companies, domestic and foreign, to take part in primary activities such as exploration, extraction, transport and storage.
There have also been changes at the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV): The U.S. eased the sanctions imposed on it in 2019. This facilitates the reintegration of the Venezuelan financial system into international markets. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also resumed relations with Venezuela.
Half of the political prisoners have been released, many opposition leaders have returned from exile, media censorship has eased and there is greater tolerance for protest. But the main opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, still cannot return to the country, and Venezuelans remain afraid to express their opinions freely. There is also no sign that the interim regime is willing to open positions of power to the opposition. Interim President Rodriguez retains control of all institutions, confining herself to replacing Maduro loyalists with officials aligned with her own faction. For his part, Diosdado Cabello, on whom the U.S. has placed a $25 million bounty, remains the interior minister. Low wages, inflation and the lack of public services stand out among the problems facing Venezuelans. Total official monthly income is only about $240. The BCV reported cumulative inflation of 71.8% in the first quarter of 2026.
Through the remainder of 2026 and into early 2027, the U.S. intensifies its campaign against drug cartels and irregular armed groups, reducing them to a minimum with support from Colombia’s new president, Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7. Oil production continues to rise, stimulating the economy and beginning to benefit the broader population, as the stabilization and recovery phases draw to a close.
If all works out, despite resistance from the interim government, the release of political prisoners will continue and independent electoral authorities are appointed. An electoral process begins in mid- to late 2027, first at the regional and then at the national level, marking the end of the transition phase. Consequently, democratic institutions are strengthened and a legal framework emerges that restores confidence and provides the safeguards needed to attract major investment, resolving infrastructure problems in electricity, water, healthcare, roads and communications. A credible recovery plan backed by the U.S. government could accelerate the transition by tying foreign assistance to institutional reform and electoral guarantees.
Ultimately, Venezuelans need to be able to elect their own president and legislature in elections whose results are respected. The immediate priorities should be to establish a clear, publicly agreed schedule for presidential, legislative, regional and local elections. Give credible international and domestic observers access to the electoral process, including the counting and publication of results. All political forces, particularly the government and security establishment, must accept the results of a credible election. Opposition leader María Corina Machado has called for a presidential election in July 2027, arguing that sufficient time exists to prepare for it. The U.S. government and the interim authorities have not committed to that timetable. Analysts warn that rebuilding the electoral system could take more than a year. It is a long way to go and the U.S. will need to keep the pressure on Venezuela in order to create a peaceful transition to free elections and democracy. It will likely take longer and a more realistic target would be elections in 2028.