Why the Iran deal was a mistake

With the Trump–Iran agreement, it is too early to say definitively whether it was good for the U.S. The agreement is only days old, and much depends on whether the follow-on negotiations succeed. There could potentially be some benefits for the U.S. such as a stop to an active military conflict between the U.S. and Iran, costly for the U.S. and leading to increased domestic political pressure for Trump, which could be a risk for the republicans given the upcoming midterm elections. Another benefit for the U.S. is that Iran agreed to allow commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial route for global oil shipments, which could reduce risks to energy markets and the global economy. Gas prices in the U.S. are already getting cheaper, not insignificant for the American voters.

In the agreement with Iran, the U.S. agrees to lift sanctions on Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and financial transactions, and unfreeze specific funds at the Central Bank of Iran. The U.S. and regional partners will develop a minimum $300 billion reconstruction and development plan for Iran. Iran reaffirms it will not develop nuclear weapons and the current status quo of its nuclear program will be maintained pending further talks. Both sides committed to negotiating a final, binding treaty that will be endorsed by the UN Security Council within 60 days.

The agreement seems to postpone the hardest issues, especially what happens to Iran’s enriched uranium and the long-term structure of its nuclear program. It is not clear why the U.S. would give Iran time without guaranteeing a durable solution. Instead, the U.S. should have kept the pressure up and not given Iran significant concessions, including sanctions relief and the lifting of the naval blockade, before securing irreversible nuclear concessions. Because it is an interim framework rather than a final treaty, it could still collapse if either side believes the other is not complying.

It seems that the White House’s priority is ending the war, reopening shipping lanes, and reducing the risk of a wider Middle East conflict. With this in mind, the deal looks like a positive development. However, this seems to be an underlying focus on the midterm election and to stay in power and ending the war would certainly help the republicans. However, if the priority is to permanently preventing Iran from having nuclear-weapons capability, there is not yet enough evidence that the agreement accomplishes that. The key question is what emerges from the negotiations over the next 60 days.

It seems to be clear that Trump is focused on economic benefits and not human rights and regime change. Narrow agreements are easier to negotiate and nuclear talks are already extremely complex. Adding demands about Iran’s political system, elections, or leadership could most likely make an agreement impossible to reach and might only be possible to achieve by military means and an actual invasion of Iran, which is totally unlikely. Regime change is a different objective from arms control. A government may believe that preventing a nuclear weapon is achievable through inspections and verification, while changing another country’s government is far more uncertain and could require much greater pressure, internal upheaval, or military intervention. Trump will not go down this risky path and it seems that his words to the Iranian people that U.S. help was on its way was just words and nothing more. The U.S. did kill the Iranian leader and many in the leadership, but it has not resulted in liberation of the people nor regime change. Iran would likely reject talks that explicitly threaten the regime. From the Iranian leadership’s perspective, agreeing to negotiations that include regime change would amount to negotiating its own removal.

Some policymakers argue that human rights should be addressed separately. The logic is that a nuclear agreement can reduce the risk of war, while human-rights pressure can continue through diplomacy, international organizations, and support for civil society. However, providing sanctions relief without demanding major changes in Iran’s domestic behavior or political system can strengthen the regime and leave human-rights abuses unaddressed.

Bottom line is that Trump decided to abandon the Iranian people to end the war. Earlier in the conflict, Trump publicly encouraged Iranians to challenge the Islamic Republic and suggested support for those seeking political change. But the recent U.S.-Iran agreement appears aimed at ending hostilities and negotiating limits on Iran’s behavior rather than removing the regime from power. That leaves the government in Tehran stronger and more secure and the suffering in Iran will continue. The Iran government cannot be trusted and it seems that the U.S. and Israel missed a chance to get ride of the Iranian regime.