Xi in DC
Is China the U.S. new BFF? It might seem that way, or at least that Trump is trying to get closer and closer to China. Trump and Xi Jinping have met 8 times in person, following the conclusion of Xi’s state visit to Washington, D.C.. Both leaders have also confirmed plans to hold two additional face-to-face meetings before the end of the year.
The main reason Trump and Xi are meeting relatively often is not that U.S.–China relations have suddenly become friendly. It is almost the opposite as the relationship is so consequential and so full of potential flashpoints that both leaders have an incentive to keep direct communication open. Both of them realize that there is a strong dependency and that they need each other. They are trying to manage competition rather than resolve it.
The basic relationship is now one of strategic competition with trade, technology, AI, military power, Taiwan, critical minerals and global influence. Neither side appears to believe that a grand settlement is realistic. Instead, the goal is to establish boundaries and prevent competition from spiraling into a much larger confrontation. Rivalry instead of conflict. That makes leader-to-leader communication unusually important.
Trump has used tariffs and market access as major negotiating tools with China. China, meanwhile, has enormous leverage through its exports, manufacturing capacity and control of some critical minerals. An agreement earlier this year created mechanisms such as a U.S.–China Board of Trade and a Board of Investment, while China made commitments involving agricultural products, Boeing aircraft and rare-earth supply.
The meeting in DC was partly about maintaining and implementing those arrangements with the two sides essentially trying to preserve the trade truce while negotiating the areas where implementation remained incomplete. So even while Washington and Beijing compete intensely, both have an interest in avoiding an uncontrolled economic confrontation. The White House statement explicitly described the objective as building a relationship of “strategic stability.”
Taiwan is arguably the most dangerous issue in the relationship. China considers Taiwan part of China and opposes U.S. support for the island. The United States maintains an important but deliberately ambiguous security relationship with Taiwan. Because a misunderstanding between Washington and Beijing could potentially produce a military crisis, maintaining a direct channel between Trump and Xi has value even when the two governments disagree profoundly.
AI and advanced technology are becoming another major strategic arena. The relationship has expanded beyond traditional trade into AI, semiconductors, quantum technology, telecommunications and other advanced technologies. The DC summit produced agreement to establish a U.S.–China “Super Intelligence” dialogue and a bilateral communication channel for incidents involving the technology. That is essentially an attempt to create rules and communication mechanisms around an area where competition could become extremely destabilizing. The two governments appear to recognize that their competition needs a framework of cooperation to keep it from becoming a direct confrontation.
Maybe Trump and Xi are gradually creating a new form of U.S.–China G2 management of the global system, where the two superpowers compete but also negotiate directly over major global issues. One could also ask if the U.S. really should be so friendly towards China? After all, communist, authoritarian, non-democratic China is a strategic competitor, and Washington has concerns about technology transfers, industrial subsidies, cyber activity, human rights, Taiwan, and China’s aggressive military expansion. Excessive concessions could potentially weaken U.S. leverage.
After all, China is contrary of everything that the U.S. stands for. There is no competitive democracy, people who organize politically against the communist party will face surveillance, detention, imprisonment or other forms of government pressure. The government controls major news organizations and operates extensive censorship of the internet. Websites such as Facebook, X, and YouTube are blocked in mainland China, while domestic social-media platforms operate under extensive government censorship. China has developed an enormous surveillance infrastructure involving cameras, digital monitoring and internet controls. The government exercises extensive control over Tibetan religious institutions, education, language and cultural expression. Religious groups more broadly are also subject to substantial state control. Hong Kong demonstrates what happens when political autonomy conflicts with Beijing’s priorities. The list can go on and on. Bottom line is that China cannot and should not be trusted, but at this point the U.S. needs China so Trump is trying to find a way to keep the relationship going as smoothly as possible despite the fact that China is a rival and, frankly, a country with a horrible political system.